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I.

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear fission as a method for generating electrical energy is
a reality of modem American society. The issues surrounding the
debate over the future of nuclear energy policy in the United
States are complicated and cannot be reduced to a simple set of
considerations. There are environmental, economic, social, and cul
tural costs involved in using any energy source. When viewed
in a vacuum, these costs will appear unreasonable. Balanced
against these costs, however, are the societal benefits which the
use of that energy will yield. The nuclear energy debate has re
vealed that balancing these considerations is an enormous task. A
formulation of an intelligent nuclear energy policy will require a
thorough assessment of the various societal costs associated with
this energy alternative.
One major concern is that the use of nuclear fission to gener
ate electricity produces large quantities of highly toxic and poten
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tially hazardous nuclear materials. In the wrong hands, these mate
rials could be fabricated into a crude nuclear weapon or dispersed
as a powerful toxin. The possible catastrophic consequences which
could result from the malevolent use of nuclear materials dictates
that the industry adopt an almost infallible system of security. The
need to maintain this system of strict security is an important con
sideration of this energy alternative. The potential curtailment of
civil liberties that such a security system will entail must be con
sidered as one of the costs of nuclear energy. History teaches that
strong domestic security measures often engender violations of in
dividuals' constitutionally protected rights and liberties.
The entire spectrum of measures used to control the use of and
access to nuclear materials is gathered under the rubric of "nuclear
safeguards." Increased public concern over the spectre of nuclear ter
rorism has been spurred by a worldwide increase in politically mo
tivated violence. This has led to the consideration of various forms
of intensified nuclear precautionary measures to prevent the theft
or loss of nuclear materials, or the sabotage of nuclear facilities.
This article will discuss current and prospective nuclear safeguards
and evaluate their probable impact on civil liberties.
Nuclear safeguards touch many different constitutionally pro
tected rights. The breadth of the problem makes a comprehensive
constitutional analysis of each issue raised impossible for a short ar
ticle. Rather than attempt such an analysis, this article seeks only
to identify some of the potential problem areas, leaving a defini
tive legal analysis for other, more ambitious works. This article at
tempts to outline a basic framework within which a meaning
ful evaluation can occur in the scientific, legal, and political
communities.
Many of the issues raised by the controversy over nuclear safe
guards are related to the overall need for, and desirability of, nu
clear energy as an alternative to fossil fuels. No attempt will be
made here to comparatively evaluate alternative energy sources. A
cursory review of the United States' energy problem will be pre
sented, however, to establish a background for an analysis of the .
nuclear safeguards.
Overall, the energy problem may be the most difficult and
complex problem faced in the twentieth century. Modem society
has thrived on an abundantly available energy supply for many
years. The industrial world has increased its consumption of energy
as production has increased. The energy needs for production do
not account for energy resource depletion or dependence on unsta
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ble supplies. The costs associated with energy have skyrocketed
during the last seven years due mainly to OPEC's (Oil Producing
Exporting Countries) price increases. Because our country has as
sumed that there will be a constant and abundant supply of energy
for our production needs, we have designed our production to de
pend on an abundant supply.
The recognition that fossil fuel energy sources will be ap
proaching depletion in the near future has forced scientists and
politicians to earnestly seek alternative sources of energy. The en
ergy alternative most heavily relied on by the policy-makers in the
United States has been nuclear energy. Nuclear energy presently
accounts for over ten percent of the nation's electrical production.
This figure is expected to rise to over twenty percent by 1985.
Certain regions in the United States are more dependent upon this
energy alternative than others; New England, for example, pro
duces over one third of its electrical energy by nuclear fission.
Nuclear energy critics have raised many issues about energy
escalation ranging from the basic environmental and safety consid
erations to more subtle social and cultural effects of nuclear en
ergy. This article is limited to an evaluation of how an industry se
curity system may affect individual civil liberties. A general
conclusion about the desirability and acceptability of nuclear en
ergy is not offered. Neither are the relative civil liberities impact of
other energy alternatives, including possible alternative nuclear re
act6r fuel cycles, considered. 1
A.

Nuclear Energy Production

Security threats exist in all four phases of the nuclear energy
industry: The production and transport of nuclear fuel; the nuclear
energy generating process itself; the reclamation processes; and the
storage and eventual disposal of spent fuel. Security problems fall
into two categories: (1) The fear that nuclear materials will be
exploited for the manufacturing of nuclear weapons and (2) the pos
sibility that environmental contamination will occur. The level of
security required at any facility depends on the type of reactor
used and the type of nuclear materials present. Only certain nu
1. There is no reason to believe that alternative nuclear fuel cycles may not of~
fer somewhat different security considerations. Some commentators have suggested
that alternative nuclear fuel cycles may be preferable, from a safeguard standpoint,
than the plutonium recycle system analyzed here. See Ferveson, Taylor, von Hippel
& Williams, The Plutonium Economy: Why We Should Wait and Why We Can Wait,
BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, December 1976, at 10-14.
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clear materials are suitable for manufacturing nuclear weapons, and
these materials vary considerably in their potential for environmen
tal contamination.
The fuel for all commercial reactors originates from naturally
occurring uranium ore. This ore consists of varying amounts of two
different kinds of uranium. 2 The type of uranium in highest concen
tration is uranium-238 (U238). Uranium-238 alone is insufficient to
serve as fuel. It cannot be used to manufacture weapons, and it has
little potential as a toxic health hazard. It is uranium-235 (U235),
however, that is the key element to nuclear power production. The
fraction of uranium-235 occurring in natural ore is so small that no
amount of natural uranium could be used to run a United States
power plant 3 or to manufacture a nuclear weapon.

The Light Water Reactor (LWR)
The United States nuclear power industry is firmly established
around the Light Water Reactor (LWR). To fuel these reactors,
natural uranium is enriched to 2-4 percent of uranitim-235 from its
naturally occurring concentration of 0.7 percent. This slightly
enriched uranium cannot sustain a reaction which would produce a
nuclear explosion and is, therefore, unlikely to represent a serious
security threat or toxicological hazard. 4 Enriched uranium is fabri
1.

2. Every chemical element occurs in more than one form. These forms, called
isotopes, do not differ at all in their behavior relative to other chemical elements.
The only difference in isotopes of the same chemical element is their weights. Isoto
pic separation can only be done by using the weight difference of the atoms them
selves. This is far more difficult than separating different chemical elements. It
should be noted that "heavy water" is chemically the same as light water (natural
water) but contains hydrogen-2 instead of hydrogen-I. This difference is analogous
to uranium-238 being a heavier isotope of uranium than uranium-235.
3. The Canadian designed, heavy water moderated CANDU reactor uses natu
rally occurring uranium but requires a large inventory of heavy water. Manufa<;:turing
heavy water entails very sophisticated techniques and extensive facilities riot a..v.aila
ble without enormous investment due to the extreme difficulty of separatin'g the' dif
ferent isotopes of hydrogen which distinguish heavy water from light water.
4. AD Hoc WRITING GROUP OF THE SAFEGUARDS COMMITTEE, INSTITUTE OF
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT, ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC SAFEGUARDS FOR
Low-ENRICHED URANIUM (1976) (a special report appearing in NUCLEAR MATERI
ALS MANAGEMENT (August 1976)).
Uranium must be enriched to high levels (50-90%) to be used in nuclear weap
ons. Uranium enrichment requires technologies and facilities currently available to
only a few national governments. The development of new enrichment techniques
reduces the difficulty of producing enriched uranium thereby enabling countries
with limited resources to obtain nuclear weapon grade materials. Designing safe
guards for control of nuclear materials becomes increasingly difficult as the enrich
ment technology changes. See Krass, Laser Enrichment of Uranium: The Prolifera
tion Connection, 196 SCIENCE 721-31 (1977).

656

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:651

cated into a fuel assembly and reacted in the power plant. Spent
fuel is currently stored for future placement in a federal waste de
pository.
Several methods have been developed for reprocessing spent
fuel to recover and recycle any unreacted uranium-235. In addi
tion, complex reprocessing schemes may be used to recover pluto
nium (PU239 ) which is produced in small quantities as a by-product
of reactor operation. Plutonium-239 can be w~ed in place of
uranium-235 as a reactor fuel but can be more easily separated
from new fuel than uranium-235. Because crude explosive devices
can be manufactured from separated plutonium, plutonium recov
ery presents critical security considerations. 5

2. The Breeder Reactor
Since the supply of natural uranium is finite, the nuclear com
munity has searched for more efficient uses of uranium resources.
The nuclear industry and government regulators have considered
development of a breeder reactor as one alternative. The breeder
reactor uses the reaction of uranium-235 to convert the abundant
but less useful uranium-238 into valuable plutonium-239. A liquid
metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) produces plutonium-239 in
greater quantity than the uranium-235 being exhausted. The
plutonium-239 produced can then be used either as a reactor fuel
in place of uranium-235, or in mixture with uranium-235 at LWR
facilities. Since this method increases the efficiency of nuclear fuel
use by a factor of approximately seventy, it is believed that a
LWRlLMFBR fuel cycle combination will assure the United States
a supply of nuclear fuel for hundreds of years. 6
3. Safeguard Concerns
Much of the general plan for implementing a LWRlLMFBR
fuel cycle is not yet fully developed. The fuel in the present LWR
fuel cycle is an inconsequential threat at the input side of the cy
cle. The spent fuel contains many dangerous fission products in ad
5. Because plutonium is a different chemical than uranium, highly concentrated
weapon grade plutonium can be derived from plutonium bearing fuel by relatively
simple techniques in contrast to uranium slightly enriched in uranium-235. See note

2 supra.
6. R. LAPP, THE NUCLEAR CONTROVERSY 17 (1974). Some have openly at
tacked this position. See generally T. COCHRAN, THE LIQUID METAL FAST BREEDER
REACTOR, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (1974). No attempt is made here to deter
mine what the outcome of this debate will be. This study assumes use of
LWRlLMFBR fuel cycle in the future.
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dition to small quantities of plutonium, but it emits such a lethal
amount of radioactivity that potential thieves are unlikely to be in
terested in stealing it.
Recycled plutonium-239 presents several potential security
threats. Plutonium raises concern about existing safeguards because
it can be used to manufacture fission bombs and is highly toxic. All
reprocessing facilities where plutoniun-239 is separated or stored
must be subject to strict safeguards.
An individual need not steal spent fuel to cause damage.
Wherever special nuclear material 7 (SNM) is kept, and wherever a
core meltdownS at a reactor site could occur, there is a potential
for sabotage. A well-placed, conventional explosive could disperse
spent fuel in a manner that would greatly endanger lives and prop
erty.
.,
B.

Nuclear Safeguard Activities

The basic objective of nuclear safeguard strategy is to contain
special nuclear material (SNM) in an authorized channel where it
cannot be used malevolently and can be guarded against sabotage.
Any SNM existing outside authorized channels represents a serious
security breach. Thus, nuclear safeguard plans should concentrate
on preventing theft or sabotage of SNM. Careful screening of em
ployees and tight control over access to the special nuclear material
are methods employed to physically protect the material from un
authorized use. Developing an advanced warning system to antic
ipate attempts to steal or harm the special nuclear material would
serve a useful purpose should screening and access controls fail. 9 If
nuclear material is lost or stolen, the Nuclear Regulatory Commis
sion must provide a plan for its speedy recovery.
7. The Code of Federal Regulations defines special nuclear material as "pluto
nium, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in isotope 235. . . ."
10 C.F.R. § 70.4(m)(I) (1978).
8. If the nuclear fission reaction occurs too rapidly or the reactor cooling sys
tem fails or is insufficient to control the heat produced by the fission reaction, it is
possible that a core meltdown could occur, creating severe toxicological hazard in
the area.
9. A related safeguard activity is threat analysis. This involves the use of a do
mestic intelligence network to continuously gather information in an attempt to dis
cover and deter a nuclear threat before the theft or sabotage occurs. While the gen
eral civil liberty problems associated with such threat analysis operations have
become increaSingly clear during the time of the Watergate and Ellsberg break-ins, it
is beyond the scope of this article to deal with this aspect of nuclear safeguards. The
use of increased domestic intelligence activity is tied to many considerations only
one of which is nuclear safeguards.
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Traditional safeguard activities can be categorized as follows:

Access C ontral
Physically controlling access to areas in which the special nu
clear materials are kept involves using safes and vaults for storage
of SNM, security guards in and around the storage area, and phys
ical searches and surveillance of all persons entering and leaving
the storage areas. If these access control methods were· failsafe,
there would be no need for other safeguards. As better access con
trols are developed, the need for other safeguards will decrease.
1.

2.

Employee Screening

To reduce the risk of theft or sabotage, attempts are made to
carefully screen employees who are allowed access to secured
areas. The objective of preemployment screening is early recogni
tion of persons who are likely to pose a security threat. Screening
techniques may include background investigations, polygraph tests,
and psychological testing. Once an individual is employed, an on
going security evaluation may be required to detect persons who
may subsequently become a threat.

3. Recovery Operation
A recovery operation is designed to quickly locate and recover
any nuclear material that has been lost or stolen. Once SNM is be
yond authorized protective channels, it becomes a national security
threat and a potential health hazard. Immediate, drastic measures
are necessary once a theft or sabotage is discovered. This need for
immediate action may result in infringements of civil liberties.
Since there have been no publicized major occurrences of
theft or sabotage, existent recovery plans have never been imple
mented. The effectiveness of these plans, as well as their antic
ipated threat to civil liberties, remain largely hypothetical.

C.

The Nuclear Regulatory Acts
Nuclear safeguard legislation is a part of congressional regula
tion of the nuclear energy field, and it has been the subject of pub
lic and congressional debate. 10 In order to fully understand safe

10. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: SECURITY AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTs-AT BEST, INADEQUATE (1977)
(EMD-77-32).
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guard regulations, it is necessary to consider the nuclear regulatory
scheme.
Congress granted broad administrative power to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to promulgate regulations that carry
the force of law. The only limitations on its rulemaking authority
are those set by the enabling legislation (the Energy Reorganiza
tion Act and Atomic Energy Act) and the constitution. With re
gard to security, NRC is empowered to "develop ... contingency
plans for dealing with threats, thefts, and sabotage relating to spe
cial nuclear materials, high-level radioactive wastes and nuclear fa
cilities resulting from all activities licensed under the Atomic En
ergy Act of 1954. . . ."11 This mandate includes "processing,
transport, and handling of nuclear materials, including the provi
sion and maintenance of safeguards against threats, thefts, and sab
otage of licensed facilities, and materials. . . . "12 The safeguard
regulations developed under this statutory authority are based on
hypothetical threat situations rather than past experience. Conse
quently, the threat levels anticipated by NRC can be as much in
controversy as the methods developed to meet those threats.

D.

Civil Liberty Interests

The term "civil liberties" covers the entire spectrum of indi
vidual rights and freedoms guaranteed by our constitutional system
of government. The term includes rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure, as well as personal interests which underlie
various provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as rights of privacy
and individual dignity. 13
Nuclear safeguards may severely restrict these personal civil
liberties. Evaluation of safeguard activities must transcend the
question of what the courts would find constitutional. Clearly, if ac
tivities are unconstitutional they cannot be employed, but the fact
that a particular safeguard activity would survive a constitutional
challenge should not end consideration of the impacts on civil
liberties. A constitutional activity may still be undersirable. Impor
11.
12.

13.

42 U.S.C. § 5844(b)(2)(B) (1976).
[d. at § 5844(b)(1).
T. DYK, D. MARCUS, & w. KOLASKY, JR., CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPLICATIONS

OF A SAFEGUARDS PROBLEM FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN THE PRIVATE
NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRy-REpORT TO THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

4 (1975).
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tant civil liberty interests may be severely eroded by lawful as well
as unlawful activities. 14 The revelations of the late sixties and early
seventies show conclusively that when the government perceives a
compelling need to compromise civil liberties in a covert manner,
the absence of ongoing and strict control often results in serious
civil liberty violations.
The rights guaranteed by the Constitution are not interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court as absolute and are often bal
anced against other public interests. IS The Supreme Court has re
peatedly demonstrated its willingness to restrict civil liberties if
sufficient public need is shown, or to strengthen traditional defini
tions of constitutional rights if unwarranted intrusions are per
ceived. ls An important aspect of the judicial balancing of civil lib
erty interests is the presumption that, when all things are equal,
the civil liberty will stand untouched.
Nuclear safeguard techniques may affect first amendment
rights of free speech and association, fifth amendment rights of due
process and self-incrimination, and the fourth amendment right of
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. This article will an
alyze the civil liberties concern within the context of each particu
lar safeguard activity.
The potential consequences of a nuclear safeguards breach are
so catastrophic that the safeguards issue poses an urgency and sig
nificance that regulatory policymakers are unaccustomed to facing.
The growing pressure to employ an effective safeguards strategy
creates a danger of disregarding the civil liberties implications of
that strategy. In a society which values political freedom and indi
vidual rights highly, it is essential to evaluate the potential impact
of imposing prospective safeguard measures.
The assessment of potential civil liberty intrusions must in
clude an examination of the doctrinal options available to accommo
date the safeguard activity. Precedents are valuable, but not con
14. [d. at 2-3.
15. Seizure without due process, for example, has been upheld in several in
stances upon showing a compelling state interest. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245
(1946) (bank failure); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306
(1908) (unwholesome food); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (smallpox
vaccination).
16. The United States Supreme Court held until 1967 that electronic surveil
lance was not a search as used in the fourth amendment's warrant requirement.
Olmstead v, United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The Court has since recognized that
electronic surveillance is technologically capable of intruding anywhere and that the
need to physically trespass to gain information was no longer required. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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clusive. Many proposed safeguard activities are analogous to those
already used in other areas of security. 17 There are also a substan
tial number of activities, however, for which no precedents exist.
In light of the unique nature of many proposed nuclear safeguard
activities, comparison to existing precedents is, in many cases, dif
ficult. It is impossible to predict accurately how a court may re
spond to a constitutional challenge to these activities. Where pre
cedents are not well-established, all available options must be
examined.
The purpose of this analysis is to provide a basis upon which
debate can be initiated concerning civil liberty impacts of nuclear
safeguards. Such a debate is necessary to clarifY the issues so that
NRC can respond appropriately if it is challenged. In light of the
very broad delegation of power Congress has granted to NRC, it is
clearly advantageous to fully air the issues of nuclear safeguard ef
fects on constitutionally protected rights and the available doctrinal
options in advance of rule making or litigation.
II.

EMPLOYEE SCREENING

A fundamental method of safeguarding SNM is to screen indi
viduals who may be granted access to nuclear facilities. This secu
rity measure is designed to prevent the employment of individuals
who might attempt to use their position to engage in the sabotage
or theft of SNM. Since safeguard strategy dictates that those per
sons with access to sensitive positions in the nuclear industry be of
trustworthy character, a preemployment screening process is es
sential. Two methods are primarily used to assess an individual's
trustworthiness: Investigation of the individual's past activities and
investigation of the individual's contemporary status. 1S Employee
17. For example, in employee screening, compulsory disclosure questionnaires
have been used extensively in non-nuclear employment situations.
18. Presently employees of the nuclear energy industry are screened according
to methods in the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Guide. Included in
the screenirig activities is the suggestion that licensees screen their own employees.
The standard suggested is that of the American National Standard Institute (ANSI).
Regulatory guides are suggested methods for complying with regulations. At the bot
tom of each NRC guide, the NRC states:
Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public
methods acceptable to the NRC staff of implementing specific parts of the
Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in
evaluating specific problems of postulated accidents, or to provide guidance
to applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations, and
compliance with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from
those set out in the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the
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screening security programs are not new. They are currently used
for many sensitive governmental job positions in federal and state
law enforcement agencies, the military, and national security agen
cies, such as the FBI and the CIA. Consideration must be given
whether the extension of similar employee screening activities into
the civilian nuclear power industry, under NRC guidelines, will
merit constitutional justification.
A.

Legal Authority for Employee Screening Programs

Current NRC security clearance procedures, promulgated
mostly in the 1950's, were originally designed for the protection of
restricted data and national security information. 19 These proce
dures do not address the security objective of preventing the loss
or diversion of special nuclear material. With the growth of the nu
clear industry and the increased need to protect that industry, it
has become clear that new security rules must be promulgated.
Concomitant with the desire to protect the industry is the need to
protect the industry's employees from the adverse effects of an
overly intrusive security clearance program. Therefore, current and
prospective security procedures must be carefully balanced befindings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a pennit or license by
the Commission.
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGULATORY GUIDE 1.109
(1977) (an example of the editorial note on the front page of each issue).
ANSI standard 18.17 suggests procedures which are vague and applied some
what inconsistently:
4.3 Employee Screening. Procedures shall be employed for making a
detennination of the acceptability of candidates for nuclear plant employ
ment and the continuing acceptability of employees with regard to their
trustworthiness. These procedures shall include, as a minimum, the follow
ing provisions:
(1) an investigation, either prior to employment or prior to assignment to a
position allowing access without escort, to disclose adverse character traits
that might bear on his abilities or motivation to discharge his duties in a re
sponsible manner.
(2) examination by a licensed psychiatrist or physician, or other person pro
fessionally trained to identify aberrant behavior, either prior to employment
or prior to assignment to a position allowing access without escort, for the
purpose of observing and disqualifying persons displaying indications of
emotional instability such that there is reasonable doubt the person could
discharge his duties in a competent manner.
(3) continued observation of all employees and appropriate corrective meas
ures by responsible supervisors for indications of aberrant behavior of per
sonnel in the course of performance of their duties.
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD INSTITUTE, AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD FOR
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS NI8.17-1973 (1973).
19. See 10 C.F.R. § 10.1 (1978).
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tween safeguard interests and intrusions upon personal civil
liberties.
In 1974, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act to author
ize the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to establish employee
screening programs for private companies with access to special nu
clear materials. 20 The very brief legislative history of the 1974
amendment to the Atomic Energy Act indicates that Congress was
probably unaware that it was authorizing a nuclear industry secu
rity program of such potentially broad impact on constitutionally
protected rights. The legislation was passed as part of a package of
amendments described as "an AEC housekeeping bill." The only
recorded House discussion was a brief remark that the security
program was a "clarification and expansion of the Commission's au
thority with respect to licensing people who handle nuclear fuels .
. "21 There was no recorded Senate debate on the provision. 22
1.

Proposed Program

In 1977, NRC proposed changes in its employee screening
regulations. 23 These changes provide that nuclear industry employ
ees in sensitive positions be required to obtain the equivalent of a
top secret security clearance. This proposal is similar to the cur
rent program used for protection of classified information. Two lev
20. The NRC may:
[P]rescribe such regulations or orders as it may deem necessary (1) to pro
tect Restricted Data received by any person in connection with any activity
authorized pursuant to this chapter, (2) to guard against the loss or diversion
of any special nuclear material acquired by any person pursuant to section
2073 of this title or produced by any person in connection with any activity
authorized pursuant to this chapter, to prevent any use or disposition thereof
which the Commission may determine to be inimical to the common de
fense and security, including regulations or orders designating activities,
involving quantities of speCial nuclear material which in the opinion of the
Commission are important to the common defense and security, that may be
conducted only by persons whose character, associations, and loyalty shall
have been investigated under standards and specifications established by
the Commission and as to whom the Commission shall have determined that
permitting each such person to conduct the activity will not be inimical to
the common defense and security, and (3) to govern any activity authorized
pursuant to this chapter, including standards and restrictions governing the
design, location, and operation of facilities used in the conduct of such activ
ity, in order to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property.
42 U.S.C. § 2201(i) (1976).
21. 120 CONGo REc. 26373 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hosmer).
22. ld. at 22879-81 (1974). For a general legislative history see Comment,
Policing Plutonium: The Civil Liberties Fallout, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 369,
396 n.130 (1975).
23. 42 Fed. Reg. 14,880 (1977).
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els of security clearance are specified, "u" and "R." The "U" level
clearance would be required for all employees in very sensitive po
sitions, and the lower "R" clearance would be required for all other
employees. It is estimated that two-thirds of all nuclear industry
employees would need "U" clearances.
The higher "u" clearance requires an exhaustive pre-screening
investigation including a full field investigation and a National
Agency Check (NAC). The lower "R" clearance involves only the
NAC. All employees would be expected to undergo security clear
ance procedures which had the same standards and criteria as the
program used for granting access to classified material. The criteria
should be used so that "careful application of . . . [the] . . . crite
ria could recognize the differences between access of SNM and ac
cess to classified information. . . . "24
The major concerns with the new screening program from a
civil liberties standpoint involve the use of national security author
ity to justify the program, and the lack of tangible evidence
demonstrating the need for, or probable success of, the new clear
ance program. No evidence has been advanced to support the con
tention that the characteristics of a nuclear saboteur or thief are the
same as, or even similar to, those of an individual who compro
mises classified material. The mandate for "careful application" of
criteria to account for different characteristics is vague in the ab
sence of clear guidelines. Furthermore, current screening criteria
have never been validated.
The Atomic Energy Act uses both "health, safety, and welfare"
and "common defense and security" (national security) justifications
for most delegations of authority to NRC. The amendment author
izing NRC to establish a personnel screening program makes no
mention of health, safety, or welfare. 25 Therefore, the program
may be promulgated into law only if national security interests are
at stake. The NRC assertion that nuclear reactors pose no serious
threat to the health and safety of the American public does not har
monize with its contention that sabotage of a reactor justifies action
of the government under its national security power. There is real
doubt as to whether NRC can legitimately conduct personnel
screening programs consistent with the Atomic Energy Act and the
24. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, AUTHORITY FOR
ACCESS TO OR CONTROL OVER SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL; HEARINGS ON 10
C.F.R. § 11, at 20 (1978) (NRC Doc. RM50-7) (testimony of NRC staff).
25. See note 20 supra.
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federal government stance on the national security aspects of re
actor sabotage. Furthermore, the new NRC guidelines are vague at
best and fail to adequately address the distinction between access
to restricted data and access to SNM.

2.

Scope and Effectiveness of the Security Clearance Program

The magnitude of a nuclear safeguard screening program,
which might be minor compared to the total federal personnel
screening program, may appear insignificant when viewed in light
of their objective-prevention of the theft of SNM or the sabotage
of a reactor or facility containing SNM. Current screening pro
grams are designed primarily for the protection of information26
and the denial of access to those individuals who may place foreign
interests over those of the United States. 27 The objectives of nu
clear industry screening programs, however, must go beyond sim
ple data protection. Safeguard screening activities must deny access
to those who would conduct violent antisocial behavior in militant
opposition to domestic policies and are, therefore, likely to be
thieves or saboteurs. A safeguard screening program dealing with
the physical aspect of nuclear protection must (1) guard against in
ternal sabotage, (2) reduce the risk of employee theft of small
quantities of SNM, and (3) reduce the threat that a group planning
forcible theft could establish a link on the inside of a nuclear facil
ity.28 While current clearance procedures are stringent, they have
failed to fully protect classified information. In many respects, the
loss of a significant quantity of SNM poses a more serious threat
than loss of classified information. 29 Because of the devastating con
sequences of a successful diversion of SNM, screening activities for
purposes of material access will probably increase.
Employee screening currently involves the gathering of infor
mation about the job candidate to objectively evaluate his or her
suitability for the position. The industry has available to it several
different information gathering techniques. Each provides different
levels of information, and involves a different level of personal in
trusion.
26.
27.
28.
(1974).
29.

10 C.F.R. § 10.1 (1978).
See Comment, supra note 22, at 395-96.
M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR THEFT: RISKS AND SAFEGUARDS 137
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Employee Screening Activities
1. Historical Techniques

Historical techniques are characterized by investigation and
disclosure of an individual's "character, associations, and loyalty" to
determine if they are such that allowing access to SNM would be
"inimical to the common defense and security."30 These techniques
include compulsory disclosure questionnaires, national agency
checks, and full-field investigations. 31
a.

Compulsory Disclosure Questionnaires

Compulsory disclosure is a requirement of all current screen
ing programs aimed at controlling classified information. These pro
grams have existed in the nuclear industry since the early 1950's
when a screening program was established by the Atomic Energy
Commission pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act. The technique in
volves mandatory disclosure of personal information considered rel
evant to evaluating suitability for the particular job classification.
b.

National Agency Checks (NAC)

Various governmental and quasi-governmental agencies,
including the Department of Defense, Department of Motor Vehi
cles, and federal and state police agencies, obtain and store per
sonal information concerning individuals' associations, background,
and past activities. A thorough security background investigation
usually involves a check of all available governmental files.
c.

Full-Field Investigations

Full-field investigations involve informational interviews with
neighbors, friends, and associates of the prospective employee. In
these interviews, detailed questions are asked regarding the appli
cant's background and lifestyle. This type of investigatory tech
nique is clearly the most thorough form of background check short
of direct personal surveillance. 32

2. Contemporary Techniques
Contemporary techniques, called Personal Reliability Assess
ment,33 are characterized by inquiry into an individual's mental
30.
31.
32.
33.

See note 20 supra.
T. DYK, D. MARCUS, & W. KOLASKY, JR., supra note 13, at 62.
[d. at 67.
J. BARTON, INTENSIFIED NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES,
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and emotional make-up at the time of employment to identify un
stable personalities. The concern of the industry is that employees
with such personalities might, because of external or internal pres
sure, undertake theft or sabotage of SNM. 34
The objectives of this facet of personal screening programs go
beyond merely identifying potential mental illness. Criteria may be
promulgated to assess whether or not an individual's basic person
ality and other behavioral traits make it advisable that he or she
have access to SNM.35 Personal Reliability Assessment techniques
include psychological testing and evaluation, polygraph tests, and
organic correlations to violent behavior.

C.

Civil Liberty Infringements by Employee Screening Activities

The rights of civilian employees in the nuclear power industry
are directly affected by security clearance screening programs.
Since the guidelines for these screening programs are established
by the NRC pursuant to express Congressional authorization in the
Atomic Energy Act,36 some commentators have suggested that
these industry programs involve state action enabling employees to
constitutionally challenge the procedures. 37 Regardless of the prob
ability of success of such a constitutional challenge, proposed and
prospective screening activities have the potential to seriously in
trude upon the personal civil liberty interests of individuals em
ployed in the nuclear power industry. Many of the employee
screening activities herein considered may well be held to be le
gally valid, despite the fact that they infringe to some degree upon
the individual's constitutional rights. The ensuing analysis seeks to
prospectively recognize how civil liberties may be eroded by such
activities.
Employee screening activities infringe on an individual's first
amendment rights of speech and association by excluding the indi
vidual from the job market because of past or present associations
(October 31, 1975) (NRC contract no. AT (4.9-24)-0190).
34. T. DYK, D. MARCUS, & W. KOLASKY, JR., supra note 13, at 55.
35. Id. The use of PRA's is not unprecedented. The Board of Appeals of the
United States Civil Service Commission has dismissed a challenge of the Federal
Aviation Agency's use of a personality test. The Board found that "the 16 PF test [a
performance test] is a valid measurement of traits necessary to the position of air traf
fic control specialist," and that "the test deprived the Appellee of no constitutional
rights." In re D.E.L., No. 752B-74-524 at 6 (United States Civ. Servo Comm'n Bd.
of App., April 16, 1974).
36. See note 20 supra.
37. See Comment, supra note 22, at 387.
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with political or subversive groups. Exclusion based solely on an
individual's organizational membership has been held to be viola
tive of first amendment rights. 38 The United States Supreme Court
has determined that a guilt by association rationale does not justify
denying an individual constitutionally guaranteed rights. An em
ployee's past or present activities with a subversive organization, as
opposed to his or her beliefs, may be considered in the determi
nation of a security clearance. 39 The Supreme Court has indicated
that screening should be limited in scope to employees whose
positions are vulnerable to diversion, inside collaboration with
theft, or serious acts of sabotage. 4o The criteria of even a narrowly
drawn screening program must be implemented in a fair and objec
tive manner. The problems of carefully narrowing the scope of any
screening program do not end with the procedural guidelines. The
industry must realize that the administrators of such programs
must not curtail the applicant's first amendment rights by using an
overbroad interpretative analysis of the employee's background
data.
Each of the various screening mechanisms has the potential for
inhibiting or curtailing the applicant's first amendment rights. Inhi
bition of constitutional rights is not determinative of validity; com
pulsory disclosure, for example, has been upheld by the courts.
Yet the use and interpretation of overly broad questions may in
38. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). The Supreme Court declared
that membership in a communist action organization was not a sufficient basis to
deny a machinist employment in a national defense shipyard. The appeal in Robel
involved the determination of whether Section 5(a)(I)(D) of the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987, by 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(I)(D)
(1976) was constitutional. Under the statute, the denial of employment was "an
unconstitutional abridgement of the right of association protected by the First
Amendment." 389 U.S. at 261.
39. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968). The United States Supreme Court
struck down a Coast Guard employment policy which required applicants for a mer
chant marine license to complete a disclosure questionnaire which included the
compulsory listing of past organizational affiliations. Under the authority of the
Magnuson Act, 50 U.S.C. § 194 (1976), President Truman promulgated regulations,
33 C.F.R. Pt. 6 (1950), which allowed the Commandant of the Coast Guard to with
hold a permit unless the "character and habit of life of such person are such as to au
thorize the belief that the presence of the individual on board would not be inimical
to the security of the United States," 390 U.S. at 19. In its ruling, the Court indicated
that the withholding of employment could be justified on the basis of acts but not
solely on beliefs. Id. at 26. "No act of sabotage or espionage or act inimical to the
security of the United States is raised or charged in the present case." Id. See
Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971)
(upholding the use of a compulsory disclosure questionnaire for admission to the
bar).
40. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 26-27 (1968).
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trude upon an applicant's first amendment rights. Inquiry into an
individual's background may constitute an invasion of privacy, 41
where the investigator probes factors of limited or unrelated value
to the issue of employee suitability. The individual may success
fully challenge the particular investigatory mechanism on the basis
of the commonly accepted notion that privacy requires some core
of the personality be kept outside the notice of society. 42
Fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination may be in
fringed by employee screening programs that involve polygraphs.
In the United States Supreme Court's view, results of a polygraph
test may be testimonial in nature,43 so that requiring a person to
submit to the polygraph is tantamount to requiring him or her to
testify to personal aspects of his or her life. Since the right against
self-incrimination is characterized as a fundamental right,44 only a
Compelling state interest may override it.. Precluding employment
by denying a security clearance amounts to a loss of liberty and
property under the law. 45 Therefore, due process requires that the
screening criteria used by the industry must not be overly broad or
vague. 46 Further, the denial of the security clearance must be
done in a manner in which the prospective employee is afforded a
fair hearing. 47
According to present regulations, an individual may be denied

41. Privacy has been characterized as a fundamental right by the United States
Supreme Court. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973) (right of personal privacy
held to include woman's right to early abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479,494 (1965) (right of marital privacy held to encompass the use of contraceptives).
A compelling state interest must be shown to infringe on the right of privacy. Kramer
v. Union Free School Dist. no. 15, 395 U.S .. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
42. See Note, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L. J. 1462, 1474 (1973).
43. The United States Supreme Court has stated:
Some tests seemingly directed to obtain "physical evidence," for example, lie
detector tests measuring changes in bodily functions during interrogation,
may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimo
nial. To compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be
made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological re
sponses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth
Amendment.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
44. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
45. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959).
46. Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
47. "Fair Hearing" is a term usually used in connection with administrative
proceedings and connotes a hearing in which safeguards are taken to comply with
the fifth amendment's due process requirements...
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clearance if he or she "has abused trust, has been dishonest, or has
engaged in infamous, immoral or notoriously disgraceful conduct
without adequate evidence of reformation. "48 If an individual is ex
cluded on anyone of these reasons, without adequate notice and
an opportunity to be heard, the exclusion from employment would
violate the fifth amendment.
The mere fact that employee screening programs may be
found to be constitutionally valid must not end the inquiry into
their potential effects. Constitutionally authorized intrusions on civil
liberties are, nonetheless, intrusions and represent a definite social
cost of the nuclear energy alternative. The rapid growth of the nu
clear power industry will bring an increasingly large portion of the
civilian population within the industry. The increased number of
employees, together with the enormous risks posed by the adop
tion of the breeder reactor fuel cycle, may result in a proportional
increase in the intensity of pre-screening activities. An exaggerated
response by the NRC to an actual theft or threat could lead to the
imposition of even more onerous screening methods.
III.

PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROLS

Controlling physical access to areas that contain SNM is an es
sential objective of nuclear safeguards strategy. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission has issued regulations for the physical se
curity of all facilities licensed to handle special nuclear materials. 49
The NRC regulations call for establishment of a security organiza
tion to "provide physical protection against industrial sabotage and
against theft of special nuclear material. . . . "50 Prior to gaining en
try into a security area, the regulations require that all persons and
packages be searched for weapons or explosives. 51 Upon exit from
a material access area, all persons and packages must again be
searched for concealed nuclear material. 52 In addition, individuals
within the safeguarded area must be kept under constant observa
tion. 53
Various methods of search and observation are available to the
48. 10 C.F.R. § 1O.11(b)(8) (1978).
49. 10 C.F.R. § 73.40 (1978). NRC also requires the establishment of a
"security organization, including guards, to protect [the] facility against industrial
sabotage and the special nuclear material in his possession against theft." Id.
§ 73.50(a)( 1).
SO. Id. § 73.40.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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nuclear power industry. The relative intrusive effects of physical
access control alternatives will be examined to evaluate their cost
in tenns of civil liberties infringements.

A.

State Action

A threshold question concerning the effects of these safeguard
activities on constitutionally protected rights is whether the activi
ties of nuclear power company employees are subject to fourth
amendment protections. The United States Supreme Court, in
Camara v. Municipal Court 54 interpreted the purpose of the fourth
amendment as "to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by government officials. "55 If a search is
conducted by a private company primarily for its own interests, the
search is outside fourth amendment requirements. 56
Searches conducted pursuant to NRC regulation are analogous
to those conducted by the airline industry at airports. Both are re
quired by federal regulation in the interest of public safety. 57 In
several federal court decisions, Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) authorization has been held insufficient to characterize air
line searches as government searches. 58
In United States v. Fannon,59 however, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit ruled that airport searches are within the
reach of the fourth amendment because there was sufficient gov
ernmental authorization and involvement to render the search gov
ernmental. 60 Other courts are in conflict on this issue, however.
54.

387 U.S. 523 (1967).
55. [d. at 528 (emphasis added).
56. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1921).
57. 14 C.F.R. § 121.538 (1978) (requires airport searches); 14 C.F.R. § 107.4
(1978) (requires the presence of law enforcement officers at airports).
58. See United States v. Freeland 562 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
957 (1977). But see United States V. Fannon,. 556 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Ford, 525
F.2d 1308 (lOth Cir. 1975); United States V. Issod, 508 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975); United States V. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975); United States V. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir.
1973); United States v. Ogden, 485 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
987 (1974).
59. 556 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977). But compare United States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d
1365, 1371 (8th Cir. 1976), and United States v. Newton, 510 F.2d 1149, 1153 (7th
Cir. 1975), with United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1976) (en bane).
See also Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
60. 556 F.2d at 964-65. The overriding purpose of the regulations was to thwart
"a real and demonstrable threat to the public safety which the public authorities,
notably the police, have traditionally been relied upon to combat." [d. at 964. The
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Some courts have held that airport searches conducted by airlines
to prevent injury to customers and damage to property are non
governmental searches outside the fourth amendment. 61 Assuming,
however, that the nuclear industry's physical security program is
viewed as governmental, and therefore subject to fourth amend
ment requirements, an analysis of the program's impact on per
sonal privacy is appropriate.
The major area of concern from a civil liberties viewpoint is
the effect of access control activities on the physical privacy of em
ployees and visitors to nuclear facilities. Physical privacy intrusions
have traditionally been analyzed in terms of the fourth amendment
guarantees. The fourth amendment provides that people have the
right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures. . . . "62 To protect this
right, the fourth amendment requires that search warrants be is
sued only "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per
sons or things to be seized. "63
The courts have applied th~ fourth amendment by different
standards when the search involved is considered administrative
rather than criminal. A criminal search connotes hostility by the
searching officer toward the individual whose privacy is invaded in
that the ultimate goal of the search is a criminal prosecution.
The fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures is also applicable to searches and inspections con
ducted by administrative and regulatory agencies,64 even though
Fannon decision was based on United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973),
which brought all searches conducted in conjunction with the airport search program
of the FAA within the reach of the fourth amendment because the searches were
"part of a nationwide anti-hijacking program conceived, directed, and implemented
by federal officials in cooperation with air carriers." ld. at 897.
61. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has approached the issue from
an opposite direction than the Ninth Circuit. Rather than measure the amount of gov
ernmental involvement in the search program, the court considered the primary pur
pose of the company in conducting the search. In United States v. Wilkerson, 478
F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1973), the court stated, "[Slearches of luggage by airline employ
ees are private searches that are invulnerable to fourth amendment attack so long as
the searches are conducted by the carrier for its own purposes and without the insti
gation or participation of government officers." ld. at 815. See United States v.
Freeland, 562 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 957 (1977). See Note, The
Constitutionality of Airport Searches, 72 MICH. L. REV. 128, 136 n.57 (1978);
Ingram, Are Airport Searches Still Reasonable?, 44 J. AIR L. 131, 138 nAl (1978).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
63. ld.
64. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Camara v. Municipal Court,

1979]

NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

673

these intrusions are generally less hostile in nature than the typical
police officer's search for the fruits or instrumentalities of crime.
They are, however, deemed quasi-criminal because "most reg
ulatory laws . . . are enforced by criminal processes. "65 Although
administrative searches are not aimed at seeking out criminal activ
ities, cases dealing with civil searches are not void of suspect crimi
nal activity. 66
While administrative searches are not required to meet the
traditional fourth amendment requirement of probable cause, they
must, nevertheless, be reasonable. The Supreme Court in Camara
established the formula by which the reasonableness of an adminis
trative search can be established without showing a probability that
contraband will be produced in every search. The need to search
and the interest of the government in regulating the particular ac
tivity, must be balanced against the invasion of privacy involved. 67
Since the administrative search is considered only a minimal inva
sion of privacy, if the regulatory purpose for the inspection is
deemed significant, the search will probably be held reasonable.
Airport searches have been considered within the context of
administrative searches. In United States v. Davis,68 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that "searches conducted as part
of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative
purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation . . . , may
be permissible under the Fourth Amendment though not sup
ported by a showing of probable cause .... "69
The Camara Court determined that civil searches fall within
the warrant requirement. 7o In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
387 U.S. 523 (1967); Note, Inspections by Administrative Agencies: Clarification of
the Warrant Requirement, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 879 (1974).
65. 387 U.S. at 531.
66. Id. The Supreme Court in Camara recognized that administrative searches
involved regulatory laws which "were enforced by the criminal processes." Id.
67. "[Tlhere can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails." Id. at
536-37.
68. 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
69. Id. at 908.
70. 387 U.S. at 531. The Court's primary concern in establishing a warrant re
quirement was to curb the unbridled discretion of the agent in the field. Id. at
532-33. Camara overruled Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which had held
that administrative searches were not subject to the warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment. The Court stated that the fourth amendment interests at stake in
these inspection cases are not merely "peripheral." "It is .surely anomalous to say
that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amend
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States,71 the United States Supreme Court struck down an admin
istrative search for failure to obtain a warrant. The Court stipulated
that the enabling legislation in the Colonnade case did not provide
for warrantless searches, but that "Congress [did have] broad
power to design such powers of inspection . . . as it deems neces
sary to meet the evils at hand. "72
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,73 the United States Supreme
Court struck down enabling legislation that allowed warrantless
searches. While it rejected warrantless searches that were author
ized by the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Court held
that warrants required for certain administrative searches could be
issued upon a lesser showing of probable cause than is required for
criminal searches. 74
The logic of these decisions would seem to place indiscrimi
nate civil searches conducted at nuclear facilities into the category
of administrative searches since they are part of a program de
signed to deter criminal activity rather than pursue criminal ac
tions. Because the NRC regulations specifically authorize them,
searches made pursuant to the regulations may be outside the war
rant requirement. If the warrantless searches are held to be legiti
mate, any contraband discovered in a reasonable search is admissi
ble as evidence. 75
B.

Physical Access Control Activities
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires its licensees to
safeguard nuclear material in accordance with its regulations. The
United States Nuclear Regulatory_ Commission Guides 76 (NRC
ment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." Id. at 530 (foot
note omitted).
71. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
72. Id. at 76.
73. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
74. Id. at 320-21.
75. Reasonableness is determined by balancing the public interest in con
trolling unathorized use of nuclear materials with the need to guard against sabotage
to the nuclear industry while considering the privacy interests of those searched. If,
on the other hand, warrants are required, courts may allow a Barlow's type of show
ing of probable cause to suffice.
76. Regulatory guides are issued to describe and make available to the public
methods acceptable to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
regulatory staff for implementing specific parts of the NRC's regulations, to delin
eate techniques used by the staff in evaluating specific problems or post!Jlated acci
dents, or to provide guidance to applicants. Regulatory guides are not substitutes for
regulations and compliance with them is not required. Methods and solutions differ
ent from those set forth in the regulatory guide will be acceptable if they provide a
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guides) contain descriptions of activities which will satisfY these re
quirements. The guides state:
One element of this protection is proper control of access of
personnel to and from protected areas, vital areas, and material
access areas. Searching persons and packages for firearms, explo
sives, and other devices which could aid in sabotage or theft of
SNM is another element of physical protection. 77

The guides address two rather distinct conditions under which
access controls will operate: Usual day-to-day conditions and emer
gency conditions in which either an accident or emergency occurs,
or a significant amount of SNM is discovered missing.

Normal Day-to-Day Operation
Normal operations call for searches of all entering and exiting
personnel and visual surveillance of personnel within the facility.
The guides suggest:
1.

Searching of individuals can be carried out by means of
hands-on search ("frisking"), or by means of devices which will
detect the presence of weapons and explosives or SNM con
cealed on the individual, or by a combination of both. The
search should be conducted in a manner which (1) provides as
surance that firearms, explosives, and other such contraband are
not being carried into the protected area and that SNM is not
being transported out of a material access area and (2) minimized
inconvenience to the individuals being searched. The use of
equipment capable of detecting weapons, explosives, or SNM is
usually the preferable form of searching, since the use of detec
tion devices avoids the personal imposition of a hands-on
search. 78

The clear preference for avoiding the personal imposition of a
physical search is most likely a response to judicial concerns that
the "least onerous means" be used to achieve the safeguard objec
tive. The guides go on to suggest the use of "airport type" weapons
detectors, hand-held or passageway explosive detectors, and de
vices to monitor the presence of SNM.79 Standard access controls
in nuclear facilities may include the use of mechanical "hands-off"
basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a pennit or license
by the NRC.
77. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGULATORY GUIDE
5.7A (1973).
78. Jd. 5.7B.

79. [d.
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detection devices, inspection of packages, use of change rooms, vis
ual surveillance, pat-down body searches, and strip searches in
cluding body searches.
a.

Mechanical "Hands-Off' Detection Devices

The courts have addressed the constitutional issues raised by
the use of a magnetometer to search boarding passengers in air
ports. The use of this device has been upheld as an "absolutely
minimal invasion in all respects of a passenger's privacy [when]
weighed against the great threat to hundreds of persons if a hi
jacker is able to proceed . . . undetected. . . . "80 As justification
for the intrusion, it has been noted that "the plane may become a
weapon of mass destruction that no ordinary person would have
any way of obtaining except through hijacking. "81 The analogy that
SNM is a weapon of mass destruction, and that no ordinary person
would have any way of obtaining it except through illegal diver
sion, is apparent. The magnetometer search does not differ signifi
cantly from the use of other mechanical detection devices including
explosive and SNM detectors.
Since the use of a magnetometer at airports to scan millions of
travelers every year has been upheld, there is little doubt that the
courts could easily and lawfully accommodate the use of mechanical
detection devices in the far more limited scope of safeguarding nu
clear facilities. Such an extension would require no fundamental
change in case law; and the privacy intrusion involved would be
minimal.
b.

Inspection of Packages

The NRC guides state:
No individual should be allowed to directly hand carry any pack
age, valise, tool box, or similar hand-carryable item into the pro
tected area or out of a material access area. Such objects should
be handed to an attendant guard or watchman who will check
them and pass them into the protected area or out of the mate
rial access area. 82
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, B06 (2d Cir. 1974).
Id. at B02. The court described the use of magnetometers as an "absolutely
minimal invasion ... of ... privacy...." Id. at B06. "There is no detention at all;
there is no 'probing into an individual's private life and thoughts ... .' " Id. at B06
BO.
B1.

(citation omitted).
B2.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGULATORY GUIDE

5.7B (1973).
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The courts have considered the search of carry-on luggage in
the airport situation a reasonable search. 83 Similarly, the protection
of government personnel and property has been held to outweigh
the privacy intrusion involved in searching individuals entering
courthouses. 84 Since these inspection techniques have been upheld
in airport and courthouse contexts, the way is clear for courts to
view as "reasonable" the inspection of packages and parcels in the
much more limited context of access to facilities containing SNM.
c.

Pat-Down Body Searches

Once the mechanical search has indicated that an individual
may possess concealed contraband, the focus of the search becomes
much more personal, hostile, and generally intrusive. The search
then exceeds the limits of an administrative search and becomes
more like a criminal search. Courts combine aspects of administra
tive and criminal standards to satisfy fourth amendment guarantees
when these more intensive searches are required in the context of
an airport search. The initial mechanical search is upheld as a rea
sonable administrative search. The affirmative results of this search
provide the requisite level of suspicion necessary to conduct the
closer criminal search. In the airport search context, the statistical
probability that weapons will be found in only five percent of the
body searches conducted was, nevertheless, held sufficient to jus
tify the invasion when balanced against the danger at stake. 85 The
83. "A pre-boarding screening of all passengers and carry-on articles sufficient
in scope to detect the presence of weapons or explosives is reasonably necessary...."
United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973).
84. Barrett v. Kunzig, 331 F. Supp. 266, 274 (1971). "When the interest in pro
tection of the government property and personnel from destruction is balanced
against any invasion to the entrant's personal dignity, privacy, and constitutional
rights, the government's substantial interest in conducting the cursory inspection
outweighs t/le personal inconvenience suffered by the individual." Id. The Barrett
court relied on the non-accusatory nature of the search to minimize the intrusion:
The persons whose packages are inspected generally fall within a morally
neutral class. Because everyone carrying the enumerated parcels is required
to have them inspected, the inspection is not accusative in nature and the
degree of insult to the entrant's dignity is minimal. Thus, it canitot be said
that a finger of suspicion is unfairly or arbitrarily being pointed at an indi
vidual as falling within a "highly selective or suspect" group.

Id.
85. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (five percent
danger of weapons justified a frisk); People v. Dooley, 64 Cal. App. 3d 502, 512, 134
Cal. Rptr. 573, 579 (1976) ("probability of the reported bomb ... was but lout of
150, or 1,500, or whatever figure, the odds might nevertheless reasonably ..." justify
the frisk~).
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same analysis appears applicable to the nuclear facility searches.
The pat-down body search, called a "frisk," is a significant in
trusion upon an individual's privacy. The United States Supreme
Court rejected the claim that a frisk is only a "petty indignity" for
in a proper frisk, the "officer must feel with sensitive fingers every
portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search must be made of
the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin area
about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the
feet. "86 The airport frisk has been held to be "less noxious than a
frisk on the street,"87 due to the fact that airport frisks frequently
occur. The intrusion "is lessened by being one of the crowd. "88
The courts have made clear that "[t]he frisk ... is to be used
only in the last instance. "89 The inspection must first "exhaust the
other efficient and available means, if any, ... before utilizing the
frisk. "90 The scope of the frisk and inspection is also limited by the
consideration of reasonableness. The search is reasonable only if it
is limited to those places "which may reasonably be deemed to
conceal a weapon or explosive. Reasonableness, in this context, is a
matter of the probabilities. "91 The appropriate procedures, as sug
gested by the courts, include repeating a magnetometer search
after the subject has removed what he believes to have set off the
alarm. If repetition does not correct the detector's warning, it will
provide the reasonable suspicion to search more closely. The court
would probably not allow pat-down searches to be a normal pre
requisite to entry into a nuclear facility unless it can be clearly
shown that no other means exist to allow adequate access controls.
If they are used, the entrant should be allowed to remove what
ever objects he or she believes are setting off a detection device
and try to pass through again. Current case law accommodating air
port passenger screening indicates that if the pat-down search is
conducted only after all available mechanical detection equipment
has continued to indicate the presence of contraband, it will most
86. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17, n.13 (1968) (citing Priar & Martin, Searching
and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954»; United States v. Alba
rado, 495 F.2d 799, 807 (2d Cir. 1974).
87. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 807 (2d Cir. 1974).
88. [d.
89. [d. at 809.
90. [d. at 808.
91. [d. at 810 (the examination of a small parcel wrapped in aluminum foil vio
lated the legitimate scope of an airport search); United States v. Knoll, 481 F.2d 884,
886 (8th Cir. 1973).
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likely be held to be valid and reasonable in the nuclear safeguards
context. 92
d.

Use of Change Rooms

The NRC guides state:
Unless exit is into a contiguous material access area, all individu
als should exit from a material access area, other than a vault,
only via the change rooms and should be required to deposit all
work clothing in the inner change room, walk through a passage
way, and dress in street clothing in the outer change room . . . .
A guard or watchman need not be attendant except when per
sonnel are exiting from the material access area. 93

This requirement can be categorized as a health measure since
clothing which has been exposed to nuclear materials may itself be
hazardous. Furthermore, if a radiation detector signaled that the
employee was emitting excess radiation on his or her body or
clothing, it is clearly in the best interest of the employee to find
the source.
Civil liberties objections may arise when visual surveillance of
employees undressing is required. The privacy interest affected de
pends on the employee's own expectation of privacy.94 If surveil
lance activities in change rooms were conducted openly, there
would be little reason for an individual to expect privacy. Even
92. Procedures have been designed which will take these considerations into
account:
Upon annuciation of an alarm from explosive or weapon detection equip
ment located at a protected area access point attended by a lone guard or
watchman, a guard should be dispatched immediately to the access point
originating the alarm. If the access point is unattended, two guards should
be sent to the access point. At the access point the guard or watchman
should request that the individual's pockets be emptied and that the individ
ual pass again through the detection equipment. If the individual complies
and the alarms do not register, the individual may be allowed to pass into
the protected area after the contents of the individual's pockets have been
examined verifying that no attempt has been made to pass explosives or fire
arms into the protected area. If, however, an alarm continues to register, the
indiVidual should be physically searched by an unarmed security individual,
while at least one guard or armed patrol watchman observes, to verify that
no firearms or explosives are yet concealed by the individual. If the individ- .
ual refuses to comply with the request for further searching, or if a weapon
or explosives are found, the individual should be denied access.
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGULATORY GUIDES 5.7D-5a
(1973).
93. [d. at 5.7D-2a.
94. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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when open and announced surveillance is taking place, however,
NRC must still demonstrate that the surveillance is absolutely nec
essary and not merely auxiliary.
The constant thread running through the NRC guides is
the requirement that no individual be left alone or unobserved
while in a material access area. 95 The obtrusiveness of constant sur
veillance must be balanced against the need to insure safety and
the danger from non-observation. The use of change and observa
tion rooms must be made coextensive with this need. Prior warn
ing should be given and the surveillance should be made as imper
sonal as possible. The use of change rooms must be required of all
personnel entering or leaving a controlled area to avoid arbitrary
imposition. If surveillance is used in the change room, separate
rooms should be provided for men and women with observers be
ing of the same sex as those observed. The use of change and ob
servation rooms, so long as their obtrusiveness is minimized, would
seem justified when balanced against the responsibility of the nu
clear industry for the safety and welfare of its employees and the
public.

2. Response to Emergency
The NRC guides stipulate simply, in the event of an emer
gency, "[A]ll individuals should be searched for concealed SNM
before being released from the protected area or collection area. "96
No stance is taken by NRC concerning the scope of the search. A
search could involve use of a mechanical detector and perhaps a
strip search and body cavity examination. Nowhere in the regula
tions or guides is interrogation mentioned as a response to a short
age or theft. Substantial pressure for detention, search, and inter
rogation of employees would certainly result if a successful theft
occurred.
a.

Search and Seizure

Although the parameters of the inspection zone are expanded
in an emergency situation, the administrative character of the
search remains. The primary goal is to secure the material and pro
tect the public, rather than capture the criminals. 97 The statutory
95. See UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGULATORY
GUIDE 5.7 (1973).
96. Id. at 5.7D-6a.
97. This is analogous to the Biswell ruling, where the administrative nature of
the search was upheld even though the individual found to have violated the regula
tion had committed a criminal act. U.S. v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). Clearly there
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authorization to search continues; the urgency of the situation pro
vides the exigent circumstances necessary for a warrantless search.
The searches are "reasonable" administrative searches because the
interest in containing the potentially dangerous material far out
weighs the minor intrusion of a blanket search with a mechanical
detector.
The expanded procedures for searches in an emergency situa
tion are defensible on the same grounds as searches in a normal
situation. It is reasonable to increase the scope of the intrusion to a
larger area and a greater number of individuals since the counter
vailing public danger is imminent.
b.

Arrest and Detention

In an emergency, two concerns arise with respect to employ
ees. One is that an employee's health may be jeopardized; the
other is that an employee may be the perpetrator of an SNM theft
or sabotage. 98 Arrest and detention powers have been upheld
when the arrest and detention are performed "to further the social
interest in public health . . . . "99 As one author notes, "That power
must, of necessity, include the power to detain and confine persons
suspected of having contracted or been exposed to an infectious
disease; without need to resort to judicial proceedings. "100
A worker who is carrying even a minute amount of plutonium
represents a substantial health hazard not only to himself or her
self, but also to others who share any space with him or her. There
is a great similarity between toxicity and disease in this context. If
detention or arrest is pursuant to the possibility of unintentional
transport of SNM by an individual or group, then current case law.>.",
upholding quarantines as a health measure may be applicable.
If arrest or detention results from suspicion that the individual
has stolen the nuclear material, the fourth and fifth amendment re
quirements incident to criminal arrest must be observed since the
is greater concern to insure safety than to arrest criminals, but this can be said for
most crimes.
98. Portal monitors at exits to nuclear material access areas were first used to
protect the employees' health. Safeguards concern developed subsequent to this.
This progression is important in that health inspections are not aimed at finding pos
sible criminal activities, whereas conducting exactly the same search for stolen SNM
is quasi-criminal. In absence of intent to uncover criminal activity, an administrative
search is not likely to be looked upon negatively by the courts.
99. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGULATORY GUIDE
5.7 (1973).
100. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 78 (1976).
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detention is in relation to suspected criminal activity. It has been
held that statements obtained during the "custodial interrogation"
of a criminal defendant are inadmissible unless certain procedural
safeguards are employed to insure the individual's privilege against
self-incrimination. 101 The critical issue is whether an interrogation
at a nuclear facility is a "custodial interrogation" within the mean
ing of Miranda v. Arizona. 102 The United States Supreme Court
has stated that "the Miranda ... warnings were required when the
person being interrogated was 'in custody . . . or otherwise de
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' "103 It is not
clear whether the courts would find a safeguards-related interroga
tion to be a "custodial interrogation." Since the employee would
not be free to leave the facility on his or her own volition, the
Miranda safeguards might be applicable. If the Miranda require
ments are ignored, conviction in a subsequent criminal proceeding
would be jeopardized. It should be remembered, however, that re
covery of the missing SNM, rather than criminal conviction, is the
prime objective here. The interrogators would clearly be under
pressure to ignore Miranda requirements in order to more effi
cient1y locate the stolen material.
IV.

RECOVERY OPERATIONS

In the event of a successful theft of SNM, strategies may be
implemented to recover quickly the stolen material before it can
be used destructively or become a health hazard. The Department
of Energy has devised specific plans to locate and recover lost or
stolen radioactive materials, but because this information is confi
dential, it cannot be referred to in this article. Nevertheless,. there
are practical and legal reasons for undertaking a comprehensive ex
amination of possible recovery operations. 104
Recovery measures could include area-wide and perimeter
searches, electronic surveillance of suspected terrorists, detention
and interrogation with or without counsel, traffic and population
control, silencing news coverage, and imposition of martial law.
Implementation of these recovery procedures would clearly entail
suppression of civil liberties.
Recovery activities pose perhaps the most serious civil
10L Miranda v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 436 (1966).
102. ld.
103. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969).
104. M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR THEFT: RISKS AND SAFEGUARDS
152-53 (1974).
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liberties threats of all nuclear safeguards. The catastrophic threats
posed by a clandestinely developed nuclear device mandate that
law enforcement agencies undertake the most effective and expedi
ent means available to recover stolen SNM. An efficient recovery
operation is crucial to minimizing the catastrophe arising from an
unauthorized diversion of SNM. Potential thieves might be dis
suaded if it were common knowledge that the government had pre
pared effective recovery procedures.
The FBI investigates all incidents, including nuclear threats,
which involve suspected or actual violations of federal laws. That
agency would be primarily responsible for directing and co
ordinating the federal government's recovery efforts. To aid the
FBI, the Department of Energy could locate and identify radiation
producing materials.
;;

'.'

Legal Authority
Recovery operations would undoubtedly be perceived by the
public and the courts as essential to preserving society's welfare,
even though suppression of some constitutional rights would inevi
tably occur. The government could rely on several legal doctrines
to justify the intrusions. Recovery operation activities could be
based on the necessity to uphold national security, to undertake a
criminal investigation, or to act with expedience to an emergency
situation that poses imminent danger to the general welfare. Judi
cial acceptance of recovery operation procedures will depend upon
the government's ability to justify its actions under one of these le
gal theories.
Serious national security problems would arise if a foreign na
tion attempted to subvert our government through a diversion of
SNM. If SNM was stolen by a foreign agent or a person collab
orating with a foreign power, the usual requirement of obtaining a
warrant prior to the search might be eliminated. lOS
Recovery operations might also be justified as an ordinary
criminal investigation. Under this rationale, the United States Su
preme Court has established constitutional guidelines for con
ducting searches during a criminal investigation that would apply
to searches for SNM. The fourth amendment requires that all crim
inal searches be reasonable. The purpose of a search must always
be balanced against the invasion which it entails. Officials might be
required to show that other recovery techniques could not achieve
A.

105.

Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 618-23 (D.C, Cir. 1975),
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equally acceptable results. The reasonableness of a search will de
pend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
The fourth amendment also requires that a search warrant de
scribe with particularity the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. lOS The Supreme Court has held that a war
rant must be particular enough to allow the officer, "with reason
able effort to ascertain and identifY the place intended. "107 The
Court, however, would probably not allow the particularity re
quirement to preclude a reasonable search for stolen SNM. Some
commentators have concluded that the Court would be willing to
sacrifice the particularity requirement, to a degree, to maintain ju
dicial control over the search.108 It might easily justifY a relaxation
of the particularity requirement on the grave dangers that would
result if SNM were used destructively. 109
B.

Elements of Recovery of SNM

The procedures used in searching for stolen SNM necessarily
entail civil liberty intrusions. Persons may be detained by officers,
interrogated, frisked, or have their homes or vehicles searched. Of
ficers might also use electronic surveillance without informing the
person being investigated.
Recovery activities can be broken down into three broad cate
gories. First, there are activities designed to secure stolen materi
als. These involve area and perimeter searches of pedestrians and
vehicles. Next, there are steps taken to identifY perpetrators.
These include detention and interrogation, with and without coun
sel, and electronic and physical surveillance of suspected terrorists.
Finally, there are activities meant to protect the public against ex
plosion or radioactivity. These encompass forced evacuations, traffic
and population control, and possible press censorship to mitigate
panic. Individual attention to each of these recovery activities pro
vides insight to the extent of potential intrusions.

106. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
107. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925). See also Comment, su
pra note 22, at 418.
108. See Comment, supra note 22, at 420.
109. For instance, the Supreme Court has made it clear that domestic security
surveillance programs were overbroad relative to the dangers they sought to avert.
This attitude may not extend to clear cut cases of extreme emergency. United States
v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,323-24 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
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Activities to Secure Stolen SNM

a.

Area Searches
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In the absence of new legislation or rulemaking specifically ad
dressing recovery operation activities, the judiciary is likely to re
spond to area search techniques in one of several ways. A court
could declare the search unconstitutional and attempt to define
certain circumstances or statutes which might make the recovery
search acceptable; it could expand the emergency exception to allow
for warrantless searches in emergency situations involying the risk
of a nuclear incident; or it could relax both the probable cause and
particularity requirement for issuance of a search warrant.
The implications of these options are far-reaching. If the emer
gency exception was expanded, warrantless searches might later be
justified on this expanded rationale in other emergency situations
potentially less dangerous than a nuclear safeguards breach. If par
ticularity and probable cause requirements for search warrants
were relaxed, a constitutional requirement explicitly condemning
such general searches would be directly contravened. Either option
requires a fundamental change in the law of search and seizure and
directly impairs civil liberties interests. The extreme urgency of a
recovery operation, coupled with the complete lack of precedent
for such actions, makes the area search an activity which is wholly
unpredictable in impact. The impact of an area search could be
lessened if NRC established rules for treating evidence recovered
and specifically designated a government official to be in control.
b.

Perimeter Searches of Pedestrians and Vehicles

Authorities might feel compelled to search pedestrians and ve
hicles entering or leaving areas where they suspect stolen SNM is
located in order to isolate the material. Portable mechanical detect
ors, similar to the magnetometers used to search persons at air
ports, could be used for routine searches with a minimal amount of
intrusion. If time precluded obtaining these mechanical detection
devices during an emergency, officials might be required to resort
to hand searches of individuals and vehicles. The extraordinary
"need to search" for stolen SNM would presumably justify physical
searches of all nearby pedestrians. Clearly, courts would oppose
searches that were conducted arbitrarily and without uniformity, or
not confined to the object sought. The situations which permit
warrantless searches could easily be expanded to include SNM re
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covery because the emergency nature of the situation might realis
tically preclude issuance of a warrant.
A warrantless vehicle search might also be lawfully extended
to nuclear recovery activity under current case law and statutes. It
is often impractical to secure a warrant because of the mobile na
ture of a vehicle.1l0 The existing exception to the warrant require
ment for automobile searches would clearly apply here and might
be further broadened by relaxing the probable cause requirement.
These changes would not be overly intrusive since the civil liberty
implications of a vehicle search are slight, and the general welfare
implications of a successful recovery operation are great.

2. Activities to Identify Perpetrators
If SNM were diverted or stolen, great pressure would exist to
detain and interrogate all persons suspected of having knowledge of
the location of the materials or the perpetrators of the theft. De
tention and interrogation on less than probable cause has been rec
ognized by Congress and the judiciary. It is not clear whether a
nuclear safeguards breach would justify creating an exception. Law
enforcement officials, under severe pressure to recover the missing
SNM, might be forced to resort to custodial interrogations regard
less of constitutional limitations. The best alternative would be for
courts to allow detention and custodial interrogation of persons sus
pected of having inside knowledge of nuclear incidents. The threat
of a nuclear catastrophe would justify the civil liberties intrusions.
3.

Activities to Protect the Public

a.

Generally

The agency conducting the recovery operation of stolen SNM
would need broad powers to control citizens who might obstruct
the recovery. The agency might want to discourage and punish any
one who interfered with its operations, to evacuate areas where
the health hazard was great, and to deal with individuals who
might commit other crimes while disorder prevailed.
Measures employed to recover stolen SNM would vary accord
ing to the perceived severity of the threat. If the threat appeared
to be limited, such as theft of less than one kilogram of ura
nium-235, the recovery operation would include only ordinary in
vestigative techniques. If, however, greater quantities were in
110.

Carroll

Y.

United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
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volved, the recovery operation might-- include imposition of martial
law and a general suspension of constitutional rights. The President
could· also summon federal troops to control the population during
a recovery operations. 111 Curfews might have to be imposed. Cur
fews have been successfully used in urban riot situatioU:s to thin
traffic and reduce ordinary crime. 112
b.

Press Censorship

The analysis thus far has specifically addressed legal questions
concerning the mechanics of the recovery operation. Anotherperti
nent legal concern is whether news organizations could be required
by the government not to publicize the recovery operation. A de
sire for the free flow of information militates in favor of publicizing
the recovery operation. If, however, information provided to the
public was misleading or sensationalized, widespread panic could
result. General panic might be avoided if the recovery operation
was kept secret. An unpublicized recovery operation might frus
trate terrorists who steal SNM to gain access to the public eye.
Civil liberties would be severely affected if the government forced
news organizations to suppress information prior to publication.

111. The Constitution provides that the President insure that the laws are faith
fully executed. u.s. CONST. art. 2, § 2. The federal government is obliged to guaran
tee a republican form of government to the states and protect them from invasion. Id.
art. 4, § 4. Congress has the power to call out the militia to execute federal laws, sup
press insurrections, and repel invasions. Id. art. 1, § 8.
The President by statute has the power to suppress insurrections against state
governments upon request of the state governor or legislature. 10 U.S.C. § 331
(1976). However, the term "insurrection" has been narrowly construed as a threat to
the existence of the government. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974). The President could also rely upon statute giv
ing him power to use federal troops to enforce federal laws whenever "unlawful ob
structions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellions against the authority of the
United States makes it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any
State or Territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. . . ." 10 U.S.C. §
332 (1976). Courts have also been reluctant to disturb decisions to use federal troops
during times of great domestic violence. See Note, Riot Control and the Use of Fed
eral Troops, 81 HARV. L. REv. 638 (1968); Engdahl, Soldiers Riots and Revolutions:
The Law and History of Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1971). Federal soldiers employed in a recovery operation would be enforcing fed
eral law and should be given status as a law enforcement officer. See Murray, Civil
Disturbance, Justifiable Homicide and Military Law, 54 MIL. L. REV. 129, 144-45
(1971).
112. Comment, Developments in the Law: The National Security Interest and
Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1304-07 (1971); Comment, The Riot Curfew,
57 CAL. L. REV. 450 (1969).
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CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to identify some of the potential
civil liberty costs associated with the nuclear energy alternative.
From the preceeding discussion, it should be apparent that imple
mentation of a comprehensive nuclear safeguard strategy will di
rectly conflict with many constitutionally protected rights. Never
theless, increased public and industry awareness of the tremendous
risks involved will inevitably demand that such a strategy be em
ployed. It is, therefore, essential that a well-reasoned strategy be
developed to effectively accomplish safeguard objectives and, at the
same time, minimize adverse societal impacts .
. The NRC should provide specific guidance to the nuclear in
dustry on particular safeguard techniques. A regulatory guide
should be developed for licensees to follow in the event of a short
age or loss of SNM at a nuclear facility .. This guide should specify
acceptable procedures to be used in the search, detention, and in
terrogation of persons in the area. 113 It is essential that the meth
ods used in such activities be debated and agreed upon before ac
tual implementation is needed. Since nuclear safeguards are a
matter of federal law and are of national concern, these decisions
should not be left to the local industry. Similar guidance is neces
sary regarding preemployment screening procedures. NRC should
sanction specific methods of information gathering and specifically
direct how the information obtained shall be interpreted and used
in a security determination. 114 Again, in the interests of uniformity
and efficiency, it is necessary that these issues be debated and re
solved prospectively.
113. The guide might provide that when detention and/or interrogation occurs,
the individual being detained should be informed of his Miranda rights. The infor
mation turned over during such an interrogation mayor may not be given on the ba
sis of immunity from criminal prosecution. Immunity could be debated, at least ini
tially, by NRC in developing the guide. The guide might further provide that prior
notice be given to all employees that detention and/or interrogation may follow a
shortage, loss or sabotage attempt. In addition, it would be efficacious to have an at
torney or legal representative present at all interrogations to make clear on the re
cord that NRC has considered and accepted a particular legal posture (i.e., custodial
or non-custodial) which has been adhered to during the interrogation.
114. It is recommended that for the material access screening program cur
rently under consideration by the NRC, protected information be made inadmissible
as evidence in a screening determination. This could be stated briefly in the purpose
and scope section of the proposed Part II of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regula
tions. NRC gives nothing up in doing this because the Privacy Act precludes the dis
semination or retention of such information in any event. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976).
Such a statement would narrow the scope of judicial review, if litigation occurs.
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The organization and implementation of an effective recovery
operation also demands advance consideration by the NRC. Pres
ently, it is unclear which government agency would have con
trolling authority and ultimate responsibility in a recovery opera
tion. The NRC and the FBI should negotiate a memorandum of
understanding concerning the relationship, authority, and responsi
bilities of each during a recovery operation. Such advance consid
eration would mitigate confusion and panic if a substantial nuclear
theft occurred. 115
Advance legislative initiative could also resolve the open
ended conjecture which surrounds the implications of a nuclear
safeguard breach. It would be both feasible and prudent for Con
gress to enact an emergency statute to cover any nuclear safe
guard breach which substantially endangers the public. 116 The stat
ute could delegate emergency authority to a particular executive
officer such as the United States Attorney General or the Presi
dent. 117 It could specify standards for proper investigatory proce
dures 118 which are designed to minimize personal intrusions. 119
NRC has been designated by Congress as the expert body
which makes determinations concerning nuclear safeguards. The
enabling legislation grants NRC broad discretion to promulgate
115. It might be well for NRC to adopt the position that where the techniques
of ordinary law enforcement can be used in performing recovery operation investiga
tions, they should be used preferentially over national security authority. Authority
to invoke national security powers should not come from NRC unless it is the result
of a determination by a joint NRC/FBI committee. Relying on national security only
when no other legal rationale will adequately address a situation, would be totally
consistent with NRC's duty to minimize the societal impacts of nuclear energy.
116. Congressional willingness to adopt the Price-Anderson Act protecting the
economic interests of the nuclear energy industry and its insurers in the event of an
emergency indicates congressional willingness to enact legislation designed to deal
with the special problems posed by nuclear power. Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No.
85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957).
117. This same officer could also be given responsibility for the release of all
news information concerning the emergency. See note 116 supra.
118. To facilitate a recovery operation search the statute might specify an in
vestigatory standard to be the function equivalent of probable cause. This standard
might be an articulated and reasonable belief that the contraband SNM is contained
in a specific area. See notes 116-117 supra.
119. Instructions should be included that, when possible, a perimeter search
and area quarantine should be initiated to allow time for effective and less intrusive
mechanical search of the area suspected of containing contraband SNM. When possi
ble, individuals desiring to leave the area should be given the option to remain in
the suspect area until a mechanical body search is possible. Further difficulties
could be avoided by providing that any contraband found during a recovery opera
tion which is not related to the purpose of the search could be confiscated, but
would not be admissable as evidence in criminal prosecutions.
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regulations. 12o Its decisions, however, must be well-reasoned and
based on a substantial record, or they may be overturned on judi
cial review. 121 NRC can minimize the potential for negative judi
cial review by holding open, formal hearings to solicit public input
and by maintaining an adequate record to justify its rulemaking de
cisions. Although NRC is empowered to make the initial decisions
in this area, the courts will determine the ultimate validity of regu
lations that affect civil liberty interests. NRC should undertake an
honest and vigorous campaign to formulate a nuclear safeguard
strategy. It must openly debate all relevant arguments prior to
rulemaking so that the validity of its decisions can be effectively
evaluated on the record as a whole. It should actively seek input
from all interested parties and welcome judicial review of its re
sulting decisions. It is only through the interplay of open adminis
trative decisionmaking and effective judicial review that a safe and
efficient nuclear safeguard strategy can be developed.
Many of the factors pushing the United States toward in
creased domestic security measures are independent of the nuclear
energy controversy. The issues raised by nuclear safeguards are
just some of the many novel problems resulting from rapid, ad
vanced technological development. Current United States nuclear
policy has primarily focused on the threat of worldwide nuclear
weapons proliferation rather than the safeguarding of nuclear
generating facilities. The recent near-disaster at the Three-Mile Is
land Nuclear Facility in Pennsylvania, however, has shocked the
public into awareness of the threats posed by even the peaceful use
of nuclear energy.122 Undoubtedly, the government will be in
creasingly pressured to effectively and safely regulate the civilian
nuclear power industry. One can only hope that rationality will
prevail in the ensuing debate about whether individual constitu
tional rights should be maintained in the face of increasing
technological impediments.
120. See notes 11-12 supra.
121. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976).
122. See, e.g., Now Comes the Fallout: Back from the Brink; aftermath of the
Three Mile Island Incident, TIME, April 16, 1979, at 22; Now for Operation Teaket
tle; Cooldown at Three Mile Island, TIME, April 30, 1979, at 60; Nuclear Tapes:
Transcripts of NRC Emergency Meeting concerning Three Mile Island Accident,
NEWSWEEK, April 23, 1979, at 30.

